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BOOK REVIEWS
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY FRAMEWfORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. By MASON WILLRICH. Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1969 Pp. 341.
After the Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed on July 1, 1968 by
the United States, President Johnson hailed the treaty as "the most
important international agreement linuting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began." Critics of the treaty have argued that it discriminates
against the non-nuclear weapon nations which are called upon to forego
any of the advantages of developing or possessing nuclear weapons
without an adequate guarantee of their future security or an equal opportunity to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Despite the flood of articles and books that have been written on
the spread of nuclear weapons, it has been difficult to find a comprehensive, well-written examination of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty This need has now been met by Professor Mason
Willrich's timely analysis of that treaty.
Mason Willrich, currently Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for the Study of Science, Technology, and Public Policy at
the University of Virginia, has been closely associated with the issues
of nuclear development and American policy From 1962 to 1965 he
served as the Assistant General Counsel m the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and served on the U.S. Delegation to
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva and to the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.
The book is well-organized and clearly written. The author devotes
the first three chapters to explaining the background of the treaty in
terms of the technological aspects of nuclear development, the alternative ways of dealing with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the
pre-existing legal framework for nuclear arms control. In the next four
chapters he analyzes the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
in detail, and concludes the book with an assessment of the future
implications of the treaty for the control of nuclear weapons. The
appendix, which occupies about a third of the book, contains the
texts of some of the legal documents dealing with the treaty
Professor Willrich sees the world at its second cross-roads in the
nuclear era. Between 1946-1949 there was an opportunity to place
[ 279 ]

WILLIA

AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11.279

all nuclear weapons under international control, but the United States
and the Soviet Union were unable to resolve their differences on this
issue. Now we face the prospect of a rapid increase in the number of
nations possessing nuclear weapons because the technological and economic barriers to the manufacture of such weapons has been greatly
lowered. At this crucial juncture in history
[t]he underlying issue remains the same: whether world politics can master technology The Non-Proliferation Treaty does
not resolve this issue, but the Treaty does provide a needed legal
framework to help the world community come to grips
with it. In short, the treaty could become a constitutional
document in the construction of a world order in which the risks
of nuclear conflagration are successively contained while the
benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy are widely available."
In discussing the provisions and the legal implications of the NonProliferation Treaty, Professor Willrich is at his best, for he critically
examnnes each section of the treaty on the basis of the language used,
the intention of the framers, and the possible legal interpretations. In
his analysis, Professor Willrich is quick to point out the numerous
shortcomings of the treaty while noting its strengths.
One of the weaknesses of the treaty is that many of the terms used
have not been defined and are likely to cause problems of interpretation m the future. For example, nuclear-weapon powers are prohibited
from assisting non-nuclear weapon states in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons in Articles I and II, but the meaning of "manufacture" is
extremely difficult to ascertain. Does the manufacture of weapons refer only to the final assembly of the nuclear device or does it also
cover the numerous preliminary steps such as the operational decisions
to build plants and conduct tests?
Another weakness of the treaty is that it contains no provision for
the verification of compliance with the restrictions set forth. There
is no way to prevent a nation from setting up a secret nuclear
weapons program that is entirely apart from its peaceful nuclear industry and consequently not covered by the safeguard provisions of
the treaty The Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 1967 treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, provided for special inspections when any party to that treaty suspected another of viola1. M. WLLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TPEATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NucLFEA
TROL
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nons. The framers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were unwilling
to accept the principle of verification. Similarly, they could not agree
upon any procedure to resolve the differences of interpretations that
might arise as to the meaning of the treaty.
The largest source of dissatisfaction with the treaty comes from
those who feel that the non-nuclear weapon countries have been asked
to make the greatest sacrifices while the nuclear weapon powers have
the most to gain from the treaty Though Professor Willrich adnuttedly writes from an American point of view, he is very sympathetic and sensitive to this issue.
Though the United States and the Soviet Union are deeply concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, they
were unwilling to commit themselves to any proposals designed to
prohibit the further development of their own nuclear arsenals. Nonnuclear weapon countries such as India are expected to renounce their
right of acquiring nuclear weapons in return for a vague and ineffective pledge in the United Nations Security Council from the
nuclear weapon powers that threats or the use of nuclear weapons
against any non-nuclear weapon nation will not be tolerated. Similarly, while both the United States and the Soviet Union are frantically
trying to develop an effective ABM system that will protect their
own missiles and cities, the Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibits nonnuclear weapon countries from developing such systems themselves
since they involve the use of atouc explosives.
The discrimination against non-nuclear weapon nations continues
even in the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy, for the use of
nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is prohibited in the case of
the non-nuclear weapon states while the nuclear weapon powers are
allowed to develop and use them. Furthermore, the atomic energy
industries of the non-nuclear weapon countries are subject to international inspections (and the possibilities of disclosure of valuable commercial secrets) whereas the nuclear weapon states are exempt from
any inspection of their own peaceful uses of atomic energy
Certainly the framers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were quite
aware of these disadvantages to the non-nuclear weapon members and
they have pledged that the nuclear weapon powers will facilitate the
fullest possible exchange of information and co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy But how reliable are such guarantees or promises? Despite the desperate need of underdeveloped countries today for increased foreign aid from the developed nations and
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the never-ending pledges by both the United States and the Soviet
Union to provide that assistance, both countries have been reducing
the amount of foreign aid in recent years. If the history of the recent
past is any guide to our future actions, the unfortunate fact emerges
that the nuclear weapon powers are likely to put their own immediate
interests ahead of the legitimate needs of the international community
Consequently it should not surprise Americans that many non-nuclear
weapon countries such as West Germany, India, and Japan are quite
reluctant to accept the Non-Proliferation Treaty in exchange for nonbinding assurances from the nuclear powers.
Despite these and several other inadequacies in the present treaty,
Professor Willrich is hopeful that the Non-Proliferation Treaty will
provide the needed framework for the eventual control of the spread
of nuclear weapons. He stresses that the treaty can and must be
amended as the international community can agree on further safeguards and arms limitations. Particularly important in this regard is
the necessity of bringing Red China within the framework of the
treaty as soon as possible. In effect, the treaty gives additional time
to try to resolve the differences of opinion on the nature and the degree of nuclear development which threatens the very existence of
mankind. Whether we use this temporary reprieve wisely or not remams to be seen.
The book is weakest where it attempts to give us an "insight into
the interactions between the processes of international politics and
technological innovation." 2 Here the legalistic and structural approach
of the author fails to handle the material adequately For example, the
changes in U.S. policy toward the spread of nuclear weapons can be
understood only within the context of the domestic and international
pressures on American foreign policy decisions. Yet the book devotes
very little attention to the reasons behind the shifts in U.S. policy
since 1946.
Despite this shortcoming, Professor Willrich's book remains an indispensable reference work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Scholars
as well as diplomats and practitioners of international law will find this
book helpful in analyzing the complicated and ambiguous provisions
of that treaty
MARis A. VmiovsKis*
2. Id. at 8, 9.
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